***Westphalian System and Geopolitics:***

The Westphalian system based on the new world order which emerged with the Westphalia Treaties of 1648 is a state-centric system which favours sovereignty of states. The Westphalian system is a system created by hegemonic great powers according to their needs and ambitions. This system has both equality and inequality in it. It is based on state sovereignty within the system so it serves equality, but there are clear distinctions between states in terms of influence, capacity, prosperity, and military strenght which leads to inequality within the system. Only fully sovereign states are seen as worthy to participate in the international system.

 The relationship of the state with nation is very important in the Westphalian system because it strengthens the concept of state (nation-state) and legitimizes it. This situation also enables to create contrasting features like “inside” and “outside,” “citizen” and “alien,” and “civilized” and “barbaric.”

The Westphalian State System is being challenged in the 21st century because of the ethnic conflicts, weak and failed states, and, non-state actors in the international system. As a result, we may move into a Post-Westphalian system within this century. However, globalization, global economy, global village concept may have problems in practice and may not be the answer for a post-Westphalia world.

The political organization of the modern world in form of a territorially divided system of states is not a function of capitalism. Rather, capitalism was ‘born into’ a system of dynastic polities that had consolidated their territories and overcome feudal fragmentation driven by the property-driven logic of political and geopolitical accumulation during the absolutist period. Consequently, capitalism was born into a territorially prefigured states-system.35 However, once agrarian capitalist property relations were institutionalized in 17th-century England, we observe the differentiation between a soft *‘economic economy’* and a *purely political state*: the making of modern sovereignty in one country.

The twin processes of capitalist expansion and regime-transformation were subsequently generalized in the West between the 18th century and World War I, driven by the dynamic logic and productive superiority of capitalism.

However, while the expansion of capitalism entailed a series of class and regime-transformations, it did not challenge the principle of multiple politically constituted territories that was a legacy of pre-capitalist territory formation.

It follows that capitalism did not cause the territorially based state-system, nor that it required a state-system, but that it is nevertheless eminently compatible with it. Capitalism’s *differentia specifica* consists in the historically unprecedented fact that the capital circuits of the world market can in principle function without infringing political sovereignty. As a rule, capitalism can leave political territories intact. Contracts are concluded between private actors that form the pre-political sphere of a global civil society. Capitalism, then, is the condition of possibility for the universalization of the principle of national self-determination. However, the functioning of the world market is predicated, at a minimum, on the existence of states that maintain the rule of law, i.e. guaranteeing contract-based

private property and the legal security of transnational transactions so as to maintain the principle of open national economies. It follows that the key idea of modern international relations is no longer the war-assisted accumulation of territories, but the multilateral political management of the crisis-potential of global capitalism and the regulation of the open world economy by the leading capitalist states. International economic accumulation and direct political domination are disjointed. A universalized capitalist world market can co-exist with a territorially fragmented system of states.

While the logic of political accumulation qua war that was systemically built into pre-capitalist dynastic states has been eliminated, the major lines of military conflict run between those states that are locked out of the world market and those states that reproduce the political conditions of the open world market, backed up by the principle of collective security.

Chronologically, the fundamental break with the old territorially accumulative logic of international relations comes with the rise of capitalism in England. The onset of agrarian capitalism in 16th-century England, the conversion of dynastic sovereignty into parliamentary sovereignty in the late 17th century and the post-Utrecht adoption of a new foreign policy resulted in the gradual de-territorialization of British interests on the Continent. At the same time, Britain began to manipulate the old inter-dynastic practice of equilibrium qua territorial compensations by dint of a new conception of active balancing. Yet, developmentally, the 18th-century world was not yet a capitalist system. During the formation of the absolutist inter dynastic world system,

Britain was the ‘third hand’ that consciously balanced the respective imperial pretensions of pre capitalist states. *Ex hypothesis*, this suggests that it was only under pressure of geopolitically mediated inter-ruling class conflicts among France and Britain, that a militarily defeated and financially bankrupt France was in a period of dramatic domestic class conflicts eventually violently forced to alter its internal social property relations. While thriving on its expanding capitalist economy, Britain continued to play off non-capitalist actors against each other, until they were financially and economically exhausted. This forced them to go through a series of geopolitically mediated crises — the French Revolution, the Napoleonic Wars, the Wars of Liberation and a sequence of further ‘Revolutions from above’. These entailed agrarian reforms, peasant liberations and state transformations. Only after the European-wide spread of capitalism, the series of European revolutions during the late 18th and 19th centuries and the ‘freeing’ of markets in favour of a world market, did the new logic of British-sponsored free trade among capitalist states impose a non-territorial logic of international surplus capture, based on non- political contracts between private citizens. (Teschke)

***Primacy:*** In the politically fragmented Europe in which the modern system of territorial states developed, military prestige was the main measure of competitive success. States formed a status system analogous to that found among social groups. Each sought to emulate the more prestigious and more modern states above them in the hierarchy.

Hence, each state sought advancement by competing with other states. Modernization entailed the endless emulation of successful Great Powers by aspiring ones. Imperial expansion has been one strategy by which to claim or maintain the status of being a Great Power. Depending on how you look at it, akin to whether you see a glass as being half-empty or half-full, every state’s goal, therefore, is either to achieve primacy or to avoid subordination.

The history of arms races is perhaps the best example of the pursuit of primacy. As each state desires primacy and/or fears subordination, any escalation in the military capacity of a potential adversary engenders a further escalation by way of response. This was the story of the ‘battleship rivalry’ between, first, Britain and France in the mid-nineteenth century and, second, Britain and Germany from 1894 until 1914. The United States and the Soviet Union followed much the same logic during the Cold War from 1947 until 1991, with each trying to outgun and out-missile the other. The famous American apostle of sea power, Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840–1914), achieved his fame in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries largely because of his strident endorsement of the view that the United States had to have a large globe-spanning navy or risk political eclipse or even invasion at the hands of those with larger, long-distance fleets. He based his claim upon an appraisal of an earlier period (1660–1783) but projected this into the indefinite future. His views proved popular with many world leaders, including Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany, who shared his belief in the strategic value of sea power to achieve worldwide domination.

This view and the practices that relate to the pursuit of primacy depend for their veracity upon a historically fixed notion of statehood and a world in which modernity is in short supply relative to perceptions of backwardness . Accepting the identity of states as self-sufficient actors with clearly bounded ‘selves’ is the most important move in both representing and practicing the pursuit of primacy. From this point of view, states have a ‘first person’ identity akin to that of individual persons. This is why it has often made sense to talk of ‘France’ doing this or ‘India’ doing that, as if each were a capable actor in its own right. One of the most powerful metaphors in modern political theory is the idea of the state as an‘organism’ or autonomous entity having a superordinate identity that cannot be reduced to any of its parts (its populations, social groups, etc.). This point of view, with its origins in ancient Greek philosophy, was given an explicitly biological cast in the late nineteenth century by authors such as one of the founders of political geography,

Friedrich Ratzel, and reached its zenith with the Nazis. It opens the state to analogical reasoning; to treatment as if it were a person or a biological individual of some type. This organic reasoning became a vital part of the modern geopolitical imagination, particularly as it developed an affinity for naturalized (fact-of-life) explanation in the late nineteenth century.

A second move sees ‘social life’, once the initial state of nature has passed, as inherently competitive. Though the state provides a means for restricting conflict and encouragingcooperation within its territorial boundaries, beyond those boundaries is in essence a pre-social world in which the English political philosopher Thomas Hobbes’s (1588–1679)‘struggle of all against all’ goes on unabated. All economic and social welfare is seen as depending on expanding your state’s capacity for violence relative to that of other states. This view has ancient European roots. The stress on the naturalness of danger and violence from strangers was used by the influential theologian St Augustine to justify war. He turned the Western Christian tradition away from pacifism by claiming that violence was intrinsic to human nature and could be channeled into righteous paths if it were used to convert the heathen and destroy the heretic. This political theology became widely accepted in Europe and underpinned the growth of ‘just war’ doctrines that were used to justify conflicts between Christian powers as well as with infidels of one kind or another. Although over the past two hundred years interstate competition has had a political–economic cast, and in recovering the elements of the argument this chapter necessarily adopts an appropriately political–economic tone, the origins of justification for military and other competitiveness in the religious history of Western Europe suggest that it has a much more deep-seated cultural history that can only be touched on here.

The problem with the social argument for inter-state competition and the emergence of Great Powers is not only theoretical, as the next section attempts to show. It is also empirical. It no longer offers the same purchase on reality that it once seemed to. At present, a dynamic of globalization is prizing open even such previously closed or self-sufficient national economies as those of China, Russia and the United States, welfare states and government ownership are being undermined by privatization all over the world, and businesses increasingly operate in terms of world-regional and global markets. In this historical context the imperatives of territorial and economic competition between states make even less sense than they did when economic and political practices jointly encouraged them. The purpose of the rest of this chapter is to identify the historical–geographical conditions in which the pursuit of primacy did perhaps make some sense and why today this component of the geopolitical imagination increasingly does not. Before we examine something of the historical geography of primacy, however, it is important to identify the major axioms upon which the presumption of a permanent or trans-historical pursuit of primacy rests. (John Agnew)